

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 April 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

(Burma)

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF MICHIGAN
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREIA do LAGO
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. V. CEBIS

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. M. STAHL
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. S. A. BOGOMOLOV
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. A. SALAM
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN
Mr. E. R. MORLAND

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. S. DePALMA
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD
Mr. I. B. RICHARDS

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. P. P. SPINELLI

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the two hundred and fifty-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In accordance with the agreed programme of work it has been decided that one or two meetings of the Committee are to be devoted to the question of general and complete disarmament if there are representatives wishing to speak on the subject.

On this subject, we should first of all like to say that in the existing circumstances, when the military budgets of States increase from year to year, when the international relations of States are becoming increasingly strained and when in one of the areas of the world, in South-East Asia, there blazes the flame of a war unleashed by the United States, the question that is bound to arise is whether there is any point, given this situation, in considering such a problem as general and complete disarmament.

In answering this question we deem it necessary to emphasize that in the atomic age, when the destructive potentialities of nuclear weapons exceed all hitherto existing conceptions of the nature of total war, and when the means of delivery of such weapons make such a war a sudden and all-embracing Blitzkrieg, the problem of general and complete disarmament cannot be removed from the agenda of international realities. This problem should be the programme, object and purpose of projects, plans and ideas, and also of all negotiations on disarmament, wherever these negotiations may take place, and at whatever levels the problem of disarmament is considered, both within this Committee and outside it. The fact that the question of general and complete disarmament has been on the agenda of the last six sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, and that at all these sessions the Assembly decisively expressed itself in favour of the speediest possible solution of this problem, speaks for itself.

The Committee should therefore continue its efforts to find a solution to this important problem. A refusal by the Committee to persist in the search for a solution to this problem would signify an altogether unjustified disregard for the

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vital interests and hopes of the peoples. Such a refusal would at the same time also signify a disregard for the decision of the General Assembly as expressed in its resolution 2031 (XX) requesting our Committee --

"... to continue its efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, ...

"... and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved" (ENDC/161).

There is no need to mention the enormous political significance that real progress in solving this problem would have. Progress in this matter would have a considerable influence on international relations. It would facilitate the expansion of co-operation between States and strengthen confidence in the relations between them, and would at the same time consolidate peace and international security. Solution of this problem would help towards releasing the vast material resources that are at present allocated to the upkeep and improvement of the military machine. These resources could be allocated to the development of the peacetime economy and to raising the standard of living of the peoples. A part of the resources released could be used for rendering technical assistance to the developing countries.

However, in reviewing the activity of the Committee, we are regrettably unable to detect any progress in accomplishing the task assigned to us of drafting a programme of general and complete disarmament. We cannot but recognize the fact that we are today as far from solving this problem as we were when, four years ago, the Committee began its work and first undertook the discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament and the consideration of specific proposals on this subject, in particular the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2).

What is the matter? What is the reason for this unsatisfactory situation regarding the examination and solution of such an important and urgent problem? In answering this question we cannot, of course, ignore the factors that give rise to difficulties in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. Among these factors it is necessary to include, first and foremost, the political policy of the United States, its aggression in Viet-Nam, its striving to maintain tension in Europe and in other regions of the world, the enormous growth of its military

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undertakings and expenditure, its efforts towards further militarization of its partners in military blocs, above all the Federal Republic of Germany, and also its plans to give the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons. All these factors are, as we have said, a very serious obstacle to progress in the examination and solution of questions of general and complete disarmament.

It is precisely in connexion with the existence of these factors hindering the solution of disarmament questions that we have recently noted an obvious lack of interest on the part of the United States and some other Western Powers that are members of the Committee in a serious, thorough and detailed examination of this problem. There is a manifest tendency to ignore the problem of general and complete disarmament altogether and to avoid its discussion on this or that pretext. There is no need to point out that such a state of affairs in regard to the consideration of questions of general and complete disarmament will entail adverse international consequences.

We have already said at the beginning of our statement that the Soviet delegation does not at all intend to ignore the existence of serious obstacles in connexion with the drafting and agreement of decisions relating to general and complete disarmament. But, even with all the difficulties and obstacles, the problem of general and complete disarmament cannot be pushed into the background; nor, for all the more reason, can it be relegated to oblivion. In the circumstances in which we have to consider this problem, greater efforts are needed for progress in solving it. Therefore we should like to urge the members of the Committee once again to undertake the concrete examination of the proposals on general and complete disarmament submitted to the Committee and, in particular, to undertake the examination of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1).

We do not intend in our statement today to set out the contents of this document. They are sufficiently well known to all members of the Committee. We should merely like to recall in this connexion that the Soviet proposal provides for the implementation in the first stage of disarmament of such radical measures as the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the elimination of all foreign bases in the territories of other countries, and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories.

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The Soviet Union is also ready to destroy nuclear weapons in the first stage, if our partners in the negotiations will agree to this. The Soviet plan is based upon the assumption that nuclear war would become practically impossible already in the first stage of disarmament. According to our plan, the whole programme of disarmament would be carried out under strict international control, fully appropriate to the scope of all the disarmament measures carried out at each stage. The end result of disarmament, according to our draft treaty, should be the elimination of all armed forces and armaments, and the complete cessation of military production and the appropriation of resources for military purposes -- in a word, the elimination of the material basis for the waging of war.

The Committee also has before it the United States proposal "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3). The Soviet delegation has already on more than one occasion made a detailed and thorough critical evaluation of the substance of this United States proposal. As we have already pointed out, this proposal does not provide for the unconditional and complete banning and destruction of nuclear weapons, nor for the speediest elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war. What the United States proposal actually amounts to is that the United States would retain until the very end of the process of disarmament the possibility of unleashing and waging a destructive nuclear war. In essence the United States plan is aimed not at disarmament but at the control of existing armaments.

Our assessment of the situation is that the United States does not wish to disarm, and especially does not wish to go as far as general and complete disarmament. In this assessment we could cite the opinions of two American scientists, John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, who are not among those scientists who are out of step with the way of thinking prevalent in the ruling circles of the United States. These scientists write that United States policy in the sphere of disarmament pursues the following aims:

"... to maintain its military might, particularly in the field of strategic nuclear weapons, to maintain NATO, to prevent the moving of the neutralist countries to the side of the communist bloc and to strengthen their support of American policies, to undermine Soviet authority in Europe and to gather as much intelligence data on the Soviet Union as possible."

The Politics of Disarmament, New York, 1962, pp. 44, 45).

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The position adopted by the United States and certain other Western Powers in regard to general and complete disarmament can in no way be said to be a constructive one. It follows from their statements here in the Committee that it will not be possible to talk about solving this problem until the political questions existing in the world have been settled. Thus the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, said that the following conditions must be met in order to achieve the objectives concerned:

"Not only must the political questions which are currently the cause of conflicts all over the world be settled, but some means must be found -- and it is to be hoped that it would be found through an improvement in the effectiveness of the United Nations -- to ensure that, when a change in social and political organization is plainly necessary in any part of the world, it can be effected peacefully without international or civil war." (ENDC/PV.249, p.7)

It is quite clear from this statement by the head of the Canadian delegation that, while he does not altogether deny the possibility of effective work at the present time on the problem of general and complete disarmament, he at least casts serious doubt on such a possibility.

Furthermore, the Canadian representative linked the solution of this problem with the need to find some means of solving the internal problems of States "without civil war". Such a formulation of the question basically contradicts the laws of the development of human society, contains a denial of the right of peoples to struggle for national liberation and against reactionary regimes, and is an attempt artificially to create new difficulties in the way of the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately, the representatives of other Western Powers share the basic principles expressed by the representative of Canada. In this connexion it is impossible not to agree with the evaluation of the position of the Western Powers made by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukanov:

"If only history came to a halt and every progressive movement stopped dead, some representatives of the West would proceed to disarm. In the meantime, however, their subjective disinclination to disarm and thus ensure the peaceful settlement of all disputes is elevated to the status of an insurmountable objective obstacle to disarmament." (ENDC/PV.250, p.41)

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We consider it necessary to point out that, in contrast to the Western Powers, the socialist countries have adopted positions which approach the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament in a constructive manner. As we have already stated, the Soviet Government still considers that a most important task of its foreign policy is to facilitate the reaching of agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Soviet Union approaches the solution of this question without bias and is ready to consider any constructive proposals that would help towards an effective solution of the problem. We are prepared to study carefully all proposals aimed at ensuring the effective and real elimination of the danger of nuclear war, and to do away with all types of armaments in general. However complicated and difficult the problem of general and complete disarmament may be, the Soviet Union is ready to work with the utmost energy on its solution.

We note with great satisfaction that the representatives of a number of non-aligned States members of our Committee have referred in their statements to the importance of the problem of general and complete disarmament and to the need to work for its solution. Reference to this was made at the beginning of the present session of the Committee by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, India, Nigeria, Mexico and others. The statements of the representatives of the non-aligned States stress the need for the Committee to devote its efforts to ensuring progress in the solution of this problem.

The Soviet delegation expects the Committee to get down in earnest to the task assigned to it of reaching agreement on the provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

Those are our comments concerning the problem of general and complete disarmament.

I should now like to take this opportunity to express some considerations in connexion with the statement made by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, at the meeting of the Committee held on 14 April. Comparing the statement of the representative of the United States and our statement on collateral measures made at the same meeting, Mr. Cavalletti expressed the view (ENDC/PV.256, p.28), if we understood him correctly, that concrete consideration of the technical details of one

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of the collateral measures, such as was undertaken by the representative of the United States in relation to the United States proposal for a halt in the production of fissionable material (ENDC/165), is preferable to consideration of the general principles underlying the collateral measures proposed by the Soviet side, such as was undertaken by our delegation.

In this connexion we should like to note that, before beginning a thorough and detailed examination of the technical and other aspects of any of the collateral measures of disarmament, it is essential to achieve at least general agreement that a basis exists for agreement on this or that question, or at any rate that the question can be a subject for positive consideration in connexion with the disarmament problem. If there is no basis for agreement and for the detailed consideration of a given problem, any attempt to go into technical aspects and details will be nothing but propaganda, even though camouflaged in a concrete and technical setting.

We could successfully develop in considerable detail each of the proposals on collateral measures that we have put forward. Thus, for example, as regards the question of the elimination of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories (ENDC/123), we could prepare a detailed document on technical aspects, dealing with the methods of destroying military installations and dismantling military equipment at the bases, methods of verifying the elimination of the bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, and so on. We could adopt a similar approach in regard to every other collateral measure that we have proposed in the field of disarmament.

The debate in the Committee could be organized in such a way that it would be like a dialogue of the deaf, with some delegations talking about the complicated technical and concrete details of one question, and others talking about the concrete details of another problem. Would there, however, be any practical point in this? Surely in this case there would be no common dialogue, nor would there be any negotiation. Would such an arrangement help the Committee to be effective? Is there any practical point in discussing all the detailed aspects of some collateral disarmament measure unless it is acknowledged, at least in principle, that such a measure can be the subject of agreement?

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It was precisely in order to avoid a dialogue of the deaf that the Soviet delegation touched in its statement of 14 April (ENDC/PV.256) on the general principles underlying a number of collateral measures in the field of disarmament, namely the elimination of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories, the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, the establishment of a security system in Europe, the cessation of underground tests of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and, in particular, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. We purposely referred to several collateral measures in the field of disarmament in order to ascertain whether there was a basis for discussion on these questions, whether there was a basis for negotiation.

We must, however, note with regret that the United States is not seeking for points of contact in considering collateral measures of disarmament. In the statement made by its representative on 14 April (ibid.) the United States submitted a detailed outline of a particular matter (ENDC/174), knowing beforehand that this could not serve in any way as a basis for agreement. The question arises: for what purpose did the United States delegation go into the detailed technical aspects of one of the collateral measures which offers no prospects for agreement? It is obvious that this was done for propaganda purposes.

We have referred to the question of organizing a discussion on collateral measures in the field of disarmament because it is of great importance for the work of the Committee. The effectiveness and direction of the Committee's work depend on the manner in which this problem is solved.

Those are our comments on the statements made by the representatives of Italy and the United States at the 256th meeting of the Committee.

I shall now say a few words about the statement made by the representative of Italy at the 257th meeting. Mr. Cavalletti spoke about the necessity of ending the arms race and adopting measures which would provide proof of goodwill and strengthen mutual trust among States, and also about the desire of the Western Powers to put a

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brake on the arms race and to cease the production of all types of weapons. In fact a similar statement was made at the same meeting by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, who outlined the principles by which States should be guided when concluding regional agreements on the limitation of armaments (ENDC/PV.257, pp.17 et seq.). We do not intend today to deal with the substance of that question. If necessary, the Soviet delegation will give its views on that subject later on. In our statement today we should like to point out that the main reasons for tension and for the growth of armaments in various geographical regions derive from factors which the representatives of the United States and Italy passed over in silence.

The facts show, unfortunately, that there is an unceasing arms race, spurred on with ever-increasing intensity by the United States and some other Western Powers. It is well known that during the time NATO has been in existence the military expenditure of its member States has become constantly greater and has increased more than fourfold. Last year alone the United States increased its military appropriations by \$16,000 million. It is now spending on armaments some \$65,000 million, allocating for the Viet-Nam war more and more thousands of millions of dollars. According to the statements of American officials, the United States plans to spend in the next few years additional tens of thousands of millions of dollars on the production of new military equipment, the improvement and construction of military bases, and other military undertakings.

In appraising the prospects for limiting armaments in various geographical regions, it is impossible to leave aside the policy pursued by the United States and some other Western Powers of interfering in the affairs of countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Therefore, if the United States wishes to create for other countries conditions that will safeguard peace, it must first of all renounce its policy of interfering in their affairs. This would ensure a relaxation of international tension, and it would then be easier to find ways for further steps in regard to limiting armaments and strengthening security in the world as a whole, as well as in its individual regions.

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It is quite clear that these factors, the list of which could be lengthened, bear witness to the desire of the Western Powers to oppose a halt in the arms race. Thus we see that the arms race still goes on; and, of course, it is preventing the solution of the problem of disarmament and shows that the Western Powers are not striving to halt it, as Mr. Cavalletti tried to convince us they wished to do.

The Soviet Union has initiated a number of measures aimed in a practical way at halting the present arms race. This is precisely the aim of its draft treaty providing for the blocking of all ways to the proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/164), the Soviet proposal for prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/123; ENDC/167) and others. The Soviet Union, like the other socialist countries, is in favour of adopting the Polish proposal for the freezing of nuclear arms in central Europe (ENDC/PV.189, p.6). However, it is well known that the Western Powers are also opposed to this very well-founded and reasonable proposal.

We should also like to make a few comments on the statement made by the representative of Canada at the meeting of the Committee held on 19 April. Mr. Burns endeavoured to criticize the position of the Soviet Union in respect of nuclear disarmament. Taking several passages in our statement out of their context, he tried on that basis to present the position of the Soviet Union on this question in a wrong light. He alleged that in this field -- the field of nuclear disarmament -- the Soviet Union had not proposed anything but total nuclear disarmament. He even described our position in this regard as "all or nothing" (ENDC/PV.257, p.8).

We should like the delegation of Canada to study not only individual passages, but the whole of the statement on collateral measures which we made at the 256th meeting of the Committee. They would then discover that we proposed a whole series of concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. Thus, we pointed out the necessity of taking steps to implement General Assembly resolution 1653(XVI), adopted as a result of the initiative of Ethiopia and some other African States, concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and providing for the convening of a special conference with a view to signing an appropriate agreement.

Further, we set forth the Soviet Government's proposal (ENDC/167) that States possessing nuclear weapons should assume a solemn obligation not to be the first to use them. In the same statement we explained in detail our position and proposal in regard to the conclusion of an international agreement on the cessation of underground nuclear tests. We also explained our position in regard to the creation of denuclearized zones in various regions and on the Polish proposals for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1) and for a freeze of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons in that area (ENDC/PV.189, p.6). Lastly, in our two previous statements we explained at length the Soviet Union's draft treaty on the banning of the proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/164).

The measures in the field of nuclear disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union, which we have set forth, give us every reason to reject decisively the assertion of the delegation of Canada that the Soviet Union insists on demanding "all or nothing" in nuclear disarmament. This assertion, I repeat, interprets our position on the question under consideration in an absolutely incorrect light.

At the same time we cannot but express our regret that the delegations of Canada and other Western Powers pass over in silence many proposals which we propose for consideration in the Committee, and in particular the proposal, which was supported by an overwhelming majority of members of the United Nations, concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. This proposal could be easily implemented. It has been supported by many States. Its adoption would have a very positive effect on the international situation as a whole.

Those are a few comments that we wished to submit on the statements made by the representatives of the Western Powers at the 257th meeting of the Committee.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): My delegation has listened with careful attention to the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union. He began with some remarks about general and complete disarmament and said that we should not forget that this is an important objective, the final objective at which we here are aiming. With these remarks which he made during the first five or six minutes of his statement we find ourselves completely in accord.

We also appreciate that the representative of the Soviet Union has taken the trouble to study our statements at previous meetings, and to reply to our arguments. Much of what he has said relates to collateral measures.

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We shall also wish to reply to some observations on collateral measures made by other representatives of Eastern European States at our 257th meeting.

I do not intend at the present meeting to attempt to continue the discussion on some of our previous remarks which has been initiated today by the representative of the Soviet Union; but I should like to assure him that I shall study his comments carefully and shall either discuss them further at a future meeting or take the opportunity of discussing them with him or other members of his delegation outside the Committee.

Towards the end of his statement the Soviet representative echoed the following comment made by the representative of Poland on 19 April:

"I unfortunately do not see any signs whatever that the Western delegations are making a serious effort to examine objectively the proposals put forward by the delegations of the socialist countries in connexion with collateral measures." (ENDC/PV.257, p.28)

The Canadian delegation would respectfully submit that the Western nations have explained many times at previous meetings why the principal proposals of the Soviet Union for collateral measures are not negotiable. However, no harm will be done if we repeat some of the reasons we have given in the past.

The representative of Czechoslovakia complained at our meeting on 19 April that Western countries have made no response to suggestions for a non-aggression pact between members of the NATO alliance and members of the Warsaw Pact (ibid., p.12). The main reason is that negotiations for a non-aggression pact do not properly fall under the heading of "Disarmament". For that reason -- and for others -- the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is not a suitable body for negotiating such a pact. Only four of the fifteen members of NATO are represented here, and not all of the members of the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, such a non-aggression pact would constitute merely a repetition of the obligations which members of both alliances have already accepted under the United Nations Charter. I would add that if representatives of the Eastern European countries will take the trouble to read the NATO Treaty, which is registered with the United Nations, they will see that it is purely defensive in character and that there is no reason for the NATO countries to enter into a pact to renounce aggressive intentions.

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In this connexion I should like to quote some sentences from the Note of the Federal Republic of Germany issued on 25 March, which all members of this Committee have received:

"As the Governments of the Soviet Union and some other East European countries have repeatedly expressed their anxiety, unfounded as it is, over a possible German attack, the Federal Government proposes that formal declarations be exchanged also with the Governments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and any other East European State, in which either side gives an undertaking to the other people not to use force to settle international disputes." (p.8)

The representatives of the Eastern European States in this Committee frequently, and in our view unjustly, accuse the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany of aggressive intentions. We should like to hear what response those countries intend to make to the proposal of the Federal Republic of Germany which I have just quoted.

The next proposal of the Soviet Union with which I wish to deal briefly is that all foreign troops be repatriated and all foreign bases be dismantled. As has been repeated many times by Western spokesmen, and as everyone can perceive, this is merely a none-too-well disguised measure for breaking up the defensive NATO alliance, which depends for its effectiveness on the ability of forces of one ally to be stationed on the territory of another as required for the common defence. As far as we can see, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries would be giving up no military advantages whatsoever to offset the disadvantages to the West of such a measure.

The representative of Italy referred on 19 April (ENDC/PV.257, p.24) to the fact that the delegation of the Soviet Union had withdrawn the draft resolution on the subject of foreign bases which it had put forward in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The reason for that, of course, was that it had come to realize that it is not only nations belonging to the NATO alliance which wish to preserve the sovereign right of any State to invite military support from friendly States if it feels itself exposed to a military threat. Generally speaking, foreign bases are the results, not the cause, of tensions; they are the result of a threat of aggression of one kind or another. They will disappear when the threat of aggression itself disappears. Incidentally, a large number of so-called foreign bases have disappeared during recent years. If we can make some progress on concrete measures of disarmament and achieve agreements in the United Nations against the use of force and

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intervention in any way in the affairs of States, more bases will doubtless disappear, until they will all be gone when we reach the final stage of general and complete disarmament.

The third proposal of the Soviet Union for a collateral measure on which I wish to speak today, and which the representative of the Soviet Union has also mentioned this morning, is for a convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.

The Canadian delegation, like every other delegation, would like to see the day arrive when we can feel that it is impossible that nuclear weapons will be used. However, we are convinced that while the arsenals of certain nations are crammed with nuclear weapons and some of the Powers possessing them refuse to call a halt to their production, any agreement not to use such weapons would be meaningless. The history of past attempts to prohibit the use of any particular kind of weapon judged to be heinous should teach us that without firm agreements not to produce such weapons, and to destroy under effective control those which already exist, they will be used in the stress of war, no matter what paper promises have been made not to use them. If the nuclear Powers adopted and began to implement a programme of reducing their nuclear armaments with a view to their eventual elimination, then promises not to use nuclear weapons would perhaps deserve some credence.

The representative of Poland, at our meeting on 19 April, argued that proposals of the Western nations for collateral measures assumed "the cold war and its continuation to be a constant factor in international life." (ENDC/PV.257, p.25). I do not think there is any responsible national government that does not want to see the end of the cold war; but the "cold" of this war, like the cold of the Central European winter, is going to disappear gradually -- not in a flash. I think it is generally agreed that both measures of political adjustment and measures of disarmament will be required to dissipate the cold, and that both types of measures should be pursued in a parallel way.

Our business in this Committee concerns disarmament measures. The Soviet Union proposals with which I have dealt briefly in my preceding remarks are presumably considered to be political, because they certainly do not provide for any disarmament. That is why, generally speaking, we do not think that they are suitable for negotiation in this Committee, whether or not they might be considered suitable for negotiation elsewhere. The political causes of the cold war, so far as they originate in Europe, are as well known to Eastern European countries as to the countries of the

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West. I do not intend to State the Western position on the underlying cause of tension in this area, as it would probably lead to useless argument unconnected with the specific business with which we are expected to deal in this Committee.

Perhaps we should all remind ourselves that the General Assembly called on us to give priority to a non-proliferation treaty and to a comprehensive test ban (A/RES/2028, 2032 (XX); ENDC/161).

The collateral measures which I discussed at the 257th meeting are, as I have argued, of a type which many non-aligned non-nuclear nations consider essential as a balance to the obligations which they would have to undertake in a non-proliferation treaty. I do not think that the same can be said of the measures which were advocated at the same meeting by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria, or of the measures -- except, of course, those on non-proliferation and the comprehensive test ban -- which were mentioned today by the representative of the Soviet Union.

I have tried to explain why certain measures advocated by the Eastern European countries do not appear to the Western countries to be susceptible of useful discussion in this Committee. I realize that I have not replied fully to the remarks made today by the representative of the Soviet Union, but I do intend to study them and may have more to say at a future meeting.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First, I should like to associate myself with the remarks just made by the representative of Canada, who covered a number of points in the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union which I believe should be answered. I do not intend to make any further comments on those points at this time. I shall study the Soviet representative's observations in the verbatim record and reserve the right to reply in somewhat more detail to some of them. Neither do I propose to comment now on the remarks concerning general and complete disarmament made by the Soviet representative this morning. But I should like to comment briefly on certain other portions of his statement and to ask two questions.

Frankly, we were astonished at the implication in the Soviet representative's remarks that he does not want to hear any explanation of how certain important measures of nuclear limitation might be readily carried out. He referred particularly to my remarks at the meeting on 14 April in connexion with the cut-off (ENDC/PV.256, pp. 10 et seq.), a subject on which interest has been very widely expressed in this Committee. Does not his suggestion that there should be no such explanation really encourage what he has spoken of as "a dialogue of the deaf"?

(Mr. Foster, United States)

As for his comment on our suggestion that regional agreements be developed to limit the spread of arms races in the more complicated non-nuclear military equipment (ENDC/PV.257, pp. 17 et seq.), is he saying that regional initiatives are not desirable in this area? I can only regret that he has seen fit to becloud with extraneous propaganda charges a constructive suggestion for such regional initiatives, since we feel that this could be a way of limiting arms by putting restrictions on activities that are extraneous and very complicated. I have noted that he has not as yet made any comment on the substance of our suggestion. We believe that our suggestion deserves consideration by this Committee. I hope that, when he has considered this suggestion further, he will find that it does provide a constructive opportunity for such regional initiatives and that he will join in supporting it and advocating this area of action to some other representatives here.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I should like to inform the Committee that there is a procedural question which we must take up before the meeting is adjourned. It concerns the date of the recess of the Conference. I understand that certain delegations have some interest in such a discussion. This might be done in an informal exchange of views now. As I hear no objection, we shall proceed to such an exchange of views.

An informal discussion took place at this point.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 258th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of U Maung Maung Gyi, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Canada and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 26 April 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

